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INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION-
SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS FEDERAL
RIGHT OF ACTION FOR VISITATION
RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ON CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION
Farsheed Fozouni*
IN Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, the Second Circuit rightly concluded that the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), the federal
statute implementing the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of In-
ternational Child Abduction (Convention), creates a federal right of ac-
tion for parents to exercise visitation rights to their children.' Citing to
the language of both ICARA and the Convention, the court found "[t]he
statutory basis for a federal right of action to enforce access rights under
the Hague Convention could hardly be clearer." 2 However, the court
could have-and should have-gone further to challenge the Fourth Cir-
cuit's previous decision in Cantor v. Cohen, which concluded that ICARA
does not create a federal right of action.3 It is imperative that the Second
Circuit's decision be adopted by other circuits not only because it is le-
gally sound, but also because the alternative would drastically inhibit the
visitation rightS4 of aggrieved parents by limiting their ability to enforce
those rights.
In 1988, the Convention came into force in the United States alongside
its federal implementation, ICARA,5 "to protect children internationally
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2015; B.A. in International Rela-
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unconditional love and support as well as the SMU Law Review Association for the oppor-
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1. See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 372 (2d Cir. 2013).
2. Id.
3. See Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 204 (4th Cir. 2006).
4. For clarification, section 11602(7) of ICARA defines "rights of access" as "visita-
tion rights." 42 U.S.C. § 11602(7) (2013).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11 (2006). See Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Interna-




from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to
establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their
habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access." 6 In
other words, the aim of the Convention was to prevent parents undergo-
ing divorce proceedings from abducting their children and "remov[ing]
[them] to a foreign country in an attempt to obtain an advantage in a
custody dispute."7 To this end, Congress passed ICARA "to establish
procedures for the implementation of the Convention in the United
States"8 and indicated that "[tihe provisions of this chapter are in addi-
tion to and not in lieu of the provisions of the Convention."9 Importantly,
ICARA states: "The Convention and this chapter empower courts in the
United States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the
merits of any underlying child custody claims."10
The Convention and ICARA applied in Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, a custody
case with facts as complicated as many divorce proceedings. Nurettin
Ozaltin (father) and Zeynep Ozaltin (mother) married in 2001.11 They
and their two daughters (children) are dual citizens of Turkey and the
United States. 12 In December 2010, the mother and father separated,
prompting the mother to move the children to New York where she had
family.13 Roughly two weeks after their separation, the father filed a peti-
tion with the Turkish Ministry of Justice, "seeking the return of the chil-
dren to Turkey pursuant to the Hague Convention."14 He subsequently
attempted to gain provisional custody of the children in a Turkish family
court.15 However, the court only granted him visitation rights on certain
days in New York and permission to bring the children back to Turkey for
two weeks "[i]n an apparent effort to give the Father greater access to the
children during the summer."' 6
The father failed to return the children to their mother by the court-
ordered end date, keeping them two weeks longer than legally permit-
ted.' 7 After the children were finally reunited with their mother in Tur-
key, but before they returned to New York, the father filed a second
petition with the Turkish Ministry of Justice.' 8 This petition requested
that the children be prevented from leaving Turkey pursuant to the Con-
vention.19 The Ministry rejected the father's petition, stating that the
6. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 5, at 4.
7. Scott M. Smith, Annotation, Construction and Application of International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11601 et seq.), 125 A.L.R. FED. 127 (1995).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(1).
9. Id. § 11601(b)(2).
10. Id. § 11601(b)(4).











Convention did not apply because the children were in Turkey. 20 In No-
vember 2011, the mother returned to New York with the children and
prevented the father from visiting his children in the manner prescribed
by the Turkish family court. 21 The father petitioned the court once again,
and his visitation rights were finally upheld.22
On March 30, 2012, the father initiated an action against the mother in
United States District Court, requesting the following pursuant to the
Convention: (1) an order to enforce his visitation rights, (2) an order to
return the children to Turkey, and (3) a costs award for all legal proceed-
ings.23 In response, the district court rendered a memorandum opinion
ordering the return of the children to Turkey, awarding the father costs
that were to be determined when litigation ended, and granting the father
visitation rights in the United States until the children's return to Tur-
key. 2 4 Regarding visitation rights, the court found that section 11603(b)
of ICARA explicitly grants federal courts jurisdiction and a right of ac-
tion by virtue of its language. 25
The mother appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that "'federal
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking to enforce
rights of access."' 26 The court of appeals affirmed both the district court's
return order and its reasoning that ICARA grants a right of action re-
garding visitation rights, but vacated and remanded the costs award. 27
The Ozaltin court found that multiple sections of ICARA clearly confer a
federal right of action for redressing violations of visitation rights.28 The
court further determined that, "while Article 21 of the Convention may
not require a signatory country to establish judicial avenues for enforcing
access rights under the Convention, Article 21 does not conflict with the
unambiguous recognition of a federal right of action in § 11603."29
In its analysis, the court reframed the mother's complaint from an ar-
gument of jurisdiction to a question of whether section 11603(b) creates a
federal right of action.30 The court then cited various sections of ICARA
as proof of the statutory authority for such a right of action.31 Section
11603(a) provides that state courts and federal district courts "have con-
20. Id. at 361-62.
21. Id. at 362.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 364-65; In re S.E.O., 873 F. Supp. 2d 536, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
25. See Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 364; In re S.E.O., 873 F. Supp. 2d at 545-46.
26. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 365.
27. Id. at 378.
28. Id. at 372.
29. Id. at 374.
30. Id. at 371 ("Properly framed, the Mother's argument is not jurisdictional in nature
but instead goes to whether § 11603(b) creates a federal right of action."). In a footnote,
the court states: "As a general matter, '[tihe question whether a federal statute creates a
claim for relief is not jurisdictional."' Id. at 371 n.23 (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Cnty. of
Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 365 (1994)).
31. See id. at 372-73.
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current original jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention." 32
Further, section 11603(b) grants anyone "seeking to initiate judicial pro-
ceedings under the Convention . . . for arrangements for organizing or
securing the effective exercise of rights of access to a child [to] do so by
commencing a civil action . . . in any court which has jurisdiction." 33 Fi-
nally, section 11603(e)(1)(B) indicates that, "in the case of an action for
arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
access," the petitioner must demonstrate such rights by a preponderance
of the evidence. 34 "Accordingly," the Second Circuit concludes, "§ 11603
unambiguously creates a federal right of action to secure the effective
exercise of rights of access protected under the Hague Convention." 35
Next, the court examined both the language of the Convention and the
Fourth Circuit's analysis in Cantor v. Cohen.36 Article 21 of the Conven-
tion states, in pertinent part: "An application to make arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access may be
presented to the Central Authorities of the Contracting States." 37 Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, the court in Cantor misinterpreted "Article
21 as stating that access rights can only be vindicated by applying to the
State Department, which is the United States'[ ] designated 'Central Au-
thority' under the Hague Convention." 38 Instead, "Article 21 . . . provides
that efforts to secure rights of access 'may' be initiated through an appli-
cation to a country's Central Authority, not that they 'may only' be pur-
sued in this way." 39 Further, the Second Circuit court refers to Article 29
of the Convention, which states: "This Convention shall not preclude any
person . . . who claims that there has been a breach of . . . access rights
within the meaning of Article . . . 21 from applying directly to the judi-
cial . . . authorities of a Contracting State, whether or not under the provi-
sions of this Convention."40 The court then references State Department
regulations, which indicate that petitioning to a "State's Central Author-
ity 'is a nonexclusive remedy' for enforcing access rights" and that Article
29 allows a petitioner "'to bypass the Convention completely.' 4 1
Finally, the court found that the State Department has an "apparent
lack of any administrative apparatus for enforcing rights of access," but
rather, "under the Hague Convention[,] must offer facilitative services to
the petitioner." 42 While this role is important, "the State Department it-
32. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2006); see also Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372.
33. Id. § 11603(b); see also Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372.
34. Id. § 11603(e)(1)(B); see also Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372.
35. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372.
36. Id. at 372-74.
37. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 5, at 10.
38. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 373. But see Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 199-201 (4th Cir.
2006).
39. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 373.
40. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 5, at 12; see also Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at
373.
41. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 373 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Conven-




self does not have authority to enforce access rights," and prior authori-
zation is not required for parents who prefer to go to court without
assistance.4 3 Although cognizant of the criticism suggesting Article 21
lacks any explicit judicial remedy,44 the court concluded: "[E]ven though
not required under Article 21, federal law in the United States provides
an avenue for aggrieved parties to seek judicial relief directly in a federal
district court or an appropriate state court." 45
The Second Circuit reasonably determined that the plain language of
both the Convention and ICARA unambiguously created a federal right
of action for parents to enforce their visitation rights. However, the court
should have gone further to counter all of the Fourth Circuit's ostensibly
sound arguments. First, there is obvious intent within the Convention to
grant an individual the ability to seek judicial relief for visitation rights.
Article 5 of the Convention defines "rights of custody" and "rights of
access," the two recognized rights the document is designed to protect.46
Throughout ICARA, Congress referenced variations of the phrases
"rights under the Convention" 47 and "actions arising under the Conven-
tion" 48 to indicate that the Act was a statutory implementation of the
Hague Convention.49 The Fourth Circuit, in Cantor v. Cohen, reasoned
that Article 21's failure to explicitly grant a judicial remedy for violations
of visitation rights prohibited, by virtue of ICARA's wording, federal
courts from hearing cases regarding such issues.50 The Second Circuit log-
ically outlines multiple sections of ICARA, which explicitly grant individ-
uals the ability to petition courts for visitation rights,51 and quoted
articles of the Convention specifically permitting judicial remedies.52 The
court concluded that, while Article 21 does not require judicial remedies,
it may be supplemented by federal law. 53 However, the court should to
have gone one step further in its reasoning. Specifically, if the Convention
explicitly permits judicial relief for visitation rights violations, whether
under Article 21 or elsewhere, then ICARA is not adding judicial reme-
43. Id. at 373-74.
44. Id. at 374 ("To be sure, some commentators have criticized the Hague Convention
(and Article 21 in particular) for having 'no firm legal provisions to enforce [access]
rights.'" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
45. Id. The court also cites the Sixth Circuit's holding in Taveras v. Taveraz: "[Ujnlike
The Hague Convention, the ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11603, does provide for judicial remedies
for non-custodial parents, namely for rights of access claims (e.g., visitation)." Id. (citing to
Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 777 n.7 (6th Cir. 2007)).
46. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 5, at 5.
47. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2006).
48. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a).
49. Section 11601(b)(1) states that "[i]t is the purpose of this chapter to establish pro-
cedures for the implementation of the Convention in the United States." 42 U.S.C.
§ 11601(b)(1) (emphasis added).
50. See Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 199-201 (4th Cir. 2006).
51. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
53. See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 374 (2d Cir. 2013).
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dies, but restating what the Convention already grants and confers. 54
Further, there are additional indications that the Convention intended
to grant judicial means of vindicating visitation rights. For instance, Arti-
cle 30 builds on the explicit right of action granted in Article 2955 by
providing that "[a]ny application submitted to the Central Authorities or
directly to the judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State
in accordance with the terms of this Convention .. . shall be admissible in
the courts or administrative authorities of the Contracting States." 56 Im-
portantly, Article 41 states: "Where a Contracting State has a system of
government under which executive, judicial and legislative powers are
distributed between central and other authorities within that State, its ...
accession to this Convention . . . shall carry no implication as to the inter-
nal distribution of powers within that State." 57 This article ensures that the
United States' constitutional distribution of powers remains intact, leav-
ing the power to determine the jurisdiction of federal courts in the hands
of Congress,58 which exercised this power by passing ICARA. Finally,
Article 42 limits reservations to Articles 24 and 26 only.59 Although the
United States made reservations to those two articles, 60 they do not per-
tain to or impact the visitation rights provisions in the Convention. 61 The
Second Circuit could and should have indicated that the court in Cantor
clearly misinterpreted the Convention, placing the United States in viola-
tion of its own laws 6 2 and of international law.
The implications of neglecting the impact of the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Ozaltin cannot be overstated. As the court discussed, the State
Department is to be facilitative, not adjudicatory. 63 The State Depart-
ment has devoted significant time on facilitative services for Convention
cases, but it "does not have authority to enforce access rights" itself.64 If
the Second Circuit's opinion is disregarded or ignored by other circuits,
54. In his dissent in Cantor v. Cohen, Judge Traxler said it best: "On its face, the un-
qualified phrase [in ICARA] 'rights under the Convention' encompasses 'rights of access'
as well as 'rights of custody."' 442 F.3d at 208 (Traxler, J., dissenting). While the Second
Circuit referenced Judge Traxler's dissent for another reason, it is unclear why this impor-
tant point was not given the same attention.
55. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372 n.25.
56. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 5, at 12 (emphasis added).
57. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 5, at 15 (emphasis added).
58. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
59. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 5, at 15.
60. See id. at 2.
61. See id. at 10-11.
62. Treaties are "equivalent to an act of the legislature" when they are "self-execut-
ing" or when "Congress has ... enacted implementing statutes." Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 373 (2d Cir. 2013).
64. See id. The court gave an example of the State Department's role: "For instance,
the State Department 'has engaged in time-consuming efforts in many cases to identify
practicing family lawyers in the jurisdiction where a child is located who are willing to
serve as counsel for a petitioning parent on a pro bono or reduced-fee basis."' Id. (quoting
Peter H. Pfund, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act, and the Need for Availability of Counsel for All Petitioners,
24 FAM. L.Q. 35, 48 (1990)).
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the potential impact on parents is enormous, as there would be no direct
means of enforcing their visitation rights. But, more importantly, the ef-
fect on children is even worse. To illustrate, "studies have shown that
leaving the country and prohibiting contact between a parent and child
has the same deleterious effect on the child regardless of which parent
has the custody right." 65 Finally, if the federal court system continues to
misinterpret ICARA and the Convention, it may put the United States in
jeopardy of violating or interfering with international obligations-some-
thing courts have been loath to do.6 6
In Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, the Second Circuit corrected a grievous and illog-
ical mistake made by the Fourth Circuit in finding that ICARA creates a
federal right of action to enforce one's parental visitation rights pursuant
to the Convention. By analyzing the plain language of both the federal
statute and the Convention, the Second Circuit appropriately concluded
that neither text could be clearer on the creation of judicial avenues of
relief to vindicate one's visitation rights. However, the Second Circuit
could have gone further by citing additional examples of the Convention
that make explicit references to the creation of the right of action, and by
specifying that ICARA merely executes those provisions under federal
law. Unless the Supreme Court considers this issue in the near future, it is
imperative that other circuits follow the Second Circuit's lead in promot-
ing an unambiguously granted federal right of action as a means of en-
forcing visitation rights. The alternative could cause devastating situations
where parents are prevented from exercising their lawful visitation rights,
and children suffer the consequences because the legal system failed in
the one thing it is duty-bound to do: to uphold justice.
65. Priscilla Steward, Note, Access Rights: A Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L. 308, 311, 355 (1997) (explaining that granting one parent custody and
one parent visitation rights is done "because it is best for the child to have the influence of
both parents.").
66. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) ("For
us to run interference in . .. a delicate field of international relations there must be present
the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities neces-
sary to make fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of interna-
tional discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.") (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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